(30.9.99 version)
A Chronology of the Mediation Attempts in July 1914
Edward Rawes
Sources: I have used the following collections of documents by Imanuel Geiss.
"Julikrise und Kriegsausbruch 1914". Published 1963 by Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen GmbH, Hanover. No ISBN number. This is in two volumes and of course in German.
"July 1914". Selected Documents". Published 1967 by B. T. Batsford, London. Again, no ISBN number. One volume and in English.
G1 below indicates the first volume of "Julikrise", G2 the second and G3 "July 1914".
Where possible, I have used G3 since the translations are probably better than mine would be but some documents appear in G1 and G2 but not in G3 (and a few vice versa) and the summary texts below are therefore based on my translations. Documents are listed by time of dispatch within day as far as possible. Those for which the time is unknown appear first
Another source used is "British Documents on the Origins of the War" assembled by Gooch and Temperley, published 1923 and indicated by "BD". It seemed pointless to translate back from German into English documents which were originally in English.
The document numbers eg G3/97 are those given in the source used.
Other significant events are entered in brackets and shown in bold type, as closely as can be in the correct time sequence.
HA indicates items proposed by our friend Hans Andriessen.
Country Abbreviations
Germany D Austria-Hungary AH
Russia R France F
Serbia S Britain GB
Italy I Belgium B
Dramatis Personae
PM = Prime Minister or equivalent. FM = Foreign Minister AM = ambassador, Cda = chargé d'affaires (deputy usually to an ambassador). Note that many ambassadors were absent from their posts when the crisis began.
Name Country Position Post
Below D AM Brussels
Benckendorff R AM Berlin
Berchtold AH PM &FS
Bethmann Hollweg D PM
Bienvenu-Martin F (Minister of Justice deputizing for Poincaré and Viviani)
Bronewski R Cda Berlin
Bunsen GB AM Vienna
Buchanan GB AM St Petersburg
Cambon, Jules F AM Berlin
Cambon, Paul F AM London
Conrad von Hötzendorff AH Chief of General Staff
Crowe GB Official
Dumaine F AM Vienna
Falkenhayn D War Minister and General
Fleuriau F Cda London
Goschen GB AM Berlin
Grey GB FM
Izvolski R AM Paris
Jagow D FM
Kudaschev R Cda Vienna
Lichnowsky D AM London
Mensdorff AH AM London
Moltke D Chief of General Staff
Nicholas II R Head of State
Nicolson GB Official
Poincaré F Head of State
Pourtalès D AM St Petersburg
Rumbold GB Cda Berlin
Sazonov R FM
Schebeko R AM Vienna
Schoen D AM Paris
Strandtmann R Cda Belgrade
Szápáry AH AM St Petersburg
Szögény AH AM Berlin
Tschirsky D AM Vienna
Tyrell GB Official
Viviani F PM & FM
Wilhelm II D Head of State
Others. TGM = telegram and D the time of dispatch and R time of receipt. Times are given in the original style. In 1914, the normal rule was for even official telegrams to be sent via a post office and the times of dispatch and receipt are those noted by the operators. Almost all the telegrams noted in this chronology were in code and enciphering and deciphering were done manually, often a slow process. It is impossible to give any indication of the average delay between the author completing the text and the final addressee receiving it in a readable form but in some cases, it could easily amount to hours. Moreover, in the last few days, there were serious difficulties and delays particularly in communications between St Petersburg and Paris.
- 3 -
Saturday 28 June
Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife murdered in Sarajevo.
Monday 20 July
Grey to Buchanan. Serbian government may have been negligent and the murder was planned on their territory. If AH's demands are kept reasonable and justifications are given, hope peace will be kept. Desirable AH and R should talk together if things get difficult. Please say so if occasion requires.
(TGM D 7 pm)
(G1/169 p. 250)
Tuesday, 21 July
Poincaré and Viviani in St Petersburg, having left Paris 15.7 and arrived 20.7.
Bethmann Hollweg to ambassador in St Petersburg, copies to Paris and Vienna.
AH must enforce its demands on S to remain a Great Power, if necessary by force Tell Sazonov so and that it is between AH and S only. "We urgently desire localisation… if not, inestimable consequences".
(G3/39, p.149)
Wednesday 22 July
Grey to Buchanan. Spoke Benckendorff today of our worry re AH and S. Said very desirable that R and AH should talk directly. He thought it difficult at the moment.
(TGM No times)
(BD/79) (HA)
Buchanan to Grey. Spoke to Serbian ambassador. Thinks situation very dangerous. Repeated this to Poincaré and contents of yours to me of 20 July. He too thought direct talks between AH and Russia to be dangerous and was more inclined to counsels of moderation in Vienna from Britain and France. Talked also to the Foreign Minister, Viviani, who emphasized that representations in favour of moderation in Vienna must not be made collectively to be acceptable. I was asked to pass this on to you.
(TGM D 13.46 R 15.22)
(G1/216, p 292) (HA)
Thursday, 23 July
AH ultimatum delivered 6pm in Belgrade and published.48 hour time limit for reply ie first by 5.00 pm and then by 6.00 pm on 25 July. Copies to D, I, F, GB and R delivered in their capitals am 24.7.
Poincaré and Viviani leave St Petersburg 23.00 ie 21.30 Central European Time.
- 4 -
Friday 24 July
(Several meetings and discussions in Entente capitals mainly concerning an extension of the time limit)
Ministerial meeting St Petersburg. Agreed to seek seek extension to give chance for the Powers to study
Buchanan to Grey. Spoke Sazonov and French ambassador. Both argued that firm and united attitude only way to avert war. Replied could only warn AH of risks and that GB would find it difficult to remain neutral if war general.
Minute ie note by Eyre Crowe. F+R will accept the challenge. Too late now to urge F to restrain R. Is D determined on war? Putting fleet on war footing might be best way of convincing D of seriousness.
Minute by Nicolson. Cabinet will want to review. Do not want to alienate R.
Minute by Grey. Churchill says fleet can be mobilized in 24 hours. Premature to make statement to F and R.
(TGM D 5.40 pm, R 8.00 pm)
(G3/68, p 196) (HA)
Grey to Bertie. Will see German ambassador this afternoon so discussed proposal for joint mediation by D, F, I and GB with Cambon. He said his government would certainly want to join in if any prospect of success but difficult to do anything until R "has expressed some opinion or taken some action".
(TGM No times)
(BD/98)
Lichnowsky to Jagow. Spoke Grey. He suggests GB, F, D and I should mediate between AH and R if dangerous tension arose between them and would join with D in urging an extension to the time limit.
(TGM.D 9.12 pm, R. 25.7 1.16 am)
(G3/57.p.183)
Sazonov to Strandtmann. If S cannot resist AH it might be better if they offer no resistance at all but retire and appeal to the Powers.
(TGM No times)
(G3/60, p. 187)
Saturday, 25 July
Moltke and Falkenhayn returned to Berlin. S mobilised and AH partially. R decided for but did not proclaim partial mobilization.
Bronewski to Sazonov. Jagow had told him that he (Jagow) had sent on the British suggestion of an extended time limit to "the Vienna government" though he saw little hope since Berchtold is away at Ischl. Assured Bronewski that AH sought no "territorial acquisitions" in S.
(TGM No times)
G3/78 p.209)
Jagow to Lichnowsky. Have passed on Grey's proposals. The ultimatum has almost run out and according to the newspapers Berchtold is still at Ischl so extension probably impossible.
(TGM D. 13.00)
(G1/341, p. 404
- 5 -
-
Berchtold to Macchio (of Austrian Foreign Ministry). From Lambach ie Ischl. R has asked for extension of time limit. Reply that no extension can be granted. S can give way afterwards but would then have to pay for our mobilization.
(TGM D. 2.00 pm, R 4.00 pm)
(G3/70, p.200)
(Ischl is about 200 kms from Vienna and 40 from Salzburg)
Lichnowsky to Jagow. Grey says D's support essential for mediation. Right moment will be when AH and R have mobilized. No desire to interfere in AH-S but AH-R is different.
(TGM D. 2.02 pm, R 5.25 pm)
(G3/73, p.205)
Szögyény to Berchtold. Berlin urging speed in case foreign powers interfere.
(TGM 2.15 pm, R 8.00 pm)
(G3/71, p.200)
Grey to Rumbold. Lichnowsky yesterday read TGM from Jagow saying D knew nothing of contents of the ultimatum. Mediation between AH and S not possible but D accepts it is possible between AH and R. Grey agrees and thought D's participation essential.
(TGM. D.3.00 pm)
(G3/82.p.212)
Rumbold to Grey. Jagow said he had sent on immediately to Tschirsky Grey's suggestion of an extended time limit and instructed him to speak to Berchtold about it but Berchtold away at Ischl. Jagow thought AH intended to take military action tho he also thought S could not swallow all of AH's demands. He hoped assurance of no territorial ambitions by AH would calm R. Jagow willing to help in mediation AH-R. Rumbold added that Jagow had assured him "very earnestly" that he had had no previous knowledge of AH's ultimatum.
(TGM D. 3.16 pm, R. 6.00 pm)
(G3/81. p.211)
Jagow to Tschirsky. Sent on text of Lichnowsky's TGM (see 24.7, G3/57 above) but omitted two parts, one of which warned that AH was underestimating S and was risking a long and costly war. Jagow doubted if an extension of the time limit was possible.
(TGM D. 16.00)
(G1/348, p. 409)
Jagow to Lichnowsky. Agree with Grey that AH-S and AH-R should be kept separate. If AH-R trouble comes will assist with mediation.
(TGM D. 11.05 pm)
(G3/75 p. 207)
Buchanan to Grey. Order to mobilize 1.100.000 men drafted this morning but will not be published till necessary apart from some preliminary preparations. Urged Sazonov that GB more useful as friendly mediator than immediate ally. He thought D and AH convinced GB would stand aside but a firm stand now by R, F and GB would avert war. Warned him that if R mobilizes, D will probably declare war at once.
(TGM D. 8.00 pm, R 10.30 pm)
(G3/83, p 213) (HA)
S replies to AH ultimatum, about 6 pm.
- 6 -
Sunday, 26 July
Discussion Conrad and Berchtold. 12.30 pm. Conrad said that R's preparations did "not necessarily yet signify mobilization" and asked to be kept informed. Berchtold wanted to declare war as soon as possible to "put an end to diverse influences". Conrad said would be ready about 12 August.
( Conrad's memoirs. Vol. IV, p.131)
(G3/86, p.226)
Lichnowsky communication. He called here this afternoon to say his government had told him that R had begun to mobilize. D would not mind if it was only say Odessa and Kiev but beyond that D will have to follow suit and then F will as well. Told him we know only that the order for partial mobilization had not been issued. Could not tell R to desist. Best hope is to prevent active military operations. Lichnowsky "liked the proposal".
(Note by Nicholson)
(BD/146)
Grey to missions in F, R, AH, S, D and I. Ask Foreign Minister if his ambassador here may join a conference here, at once.
(TGM D. 3.00 pm.)
(G3/93, p. 235)
Pourtalès to Jagow. Military attaché sends following for General Staff. Is sure that mobilization has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa districts. Warsaw and Moscow doubtful and the others probably not.
(TGM D 15.25, R 19.01)
(G2/416, p. 33)
Tschirsky to Jagow. Again urged speed on AH. Conrad said not possible before 12.8
(TGM D 4.50 pm, R 6.20 pm)
G3/88, p. 228)
Bethmann Hollweg to Pourtalès. Tell Sazonov that preparations for mobilization seen as threat to D which must mobilize. Cannot allow R to let loose a European war. AH does not want Serbian territory and R could wait to see what happens. AH will not call in question S's existence. A common understanding must be possible.
(TGM D. 19.15)
(G2/425, p 37) (HA)
Lichnowsky to Jagow. Had spoken to Nicolson and Tyrrell. They both thought a 4 Power conference was the only hope and that D and GB must cooperate. They saw no hope of localisation once Serbian border was crossed. Lichnowsky added that good relations with GB of recent times endangered and that German people must be spared a war in which they had everything to lose and nothing to gain.
(TGM D.20.25.R 27.7 0.07)
(G2/432,p.42)
Pourtalès to Jagow. Szápáry and Sazonov discussed ultimatum. Sazonov happier now no question of territorial acquisition by AH. Sazonov thought most of the note could be accepted and might find a solution for the rest. Pourtalès suggested (privately because not so instructed) direct talks AH and R. Sazonov thought good idea and would follow up. Pourtalès added "Sazonov has lost some of his nerve and is looking for a way out".
(TGM D. 10.10 pm, R. 27.7, 10.45 am)
(G3/90. P.230)
- 7 -
Monday, 27 July
Wilhelm II returned early morning to Berlin, having been away since 6 July.
Pourtalès to Jagow. At invitation of Sazonov, military attaché went to see War Minister. Latter gave his word of honour that no mobilization order had been issued. A few preparatory measures had been taken but not one horse and not one reservist had been called up. If AH invades S, Kiev, Odessa, Moscow and Kazan will be mobilized but not Warsaw, Vilna and Petersburg. Seemed very worried and anxious to keep peace with D. Believe it is true that mobilization has not been ordered but the preparatory measures are far reaching. Think him sincere and trying to gain time for negotiations but also for continued arming.
(TGM D. 1.00 R.2.35) (HA)
(G2/442 p. 52)
Bethmann Hollweg to Lichnowsky. No proposals from Grey here yet. Cannot mediate between AH and S, only AH and R. You should urge localisation in London.
(TGM. D 1.00 pm)
(G3/96, p. 237)
Grey to Buchanan. Pleased there may be direct talks R and AH. Would be glad to help but what does Sazonov propose ministers at Belgrade should do?
(TGM D 1.25 pm Repeated to Paris, Vienna, Berlin, Rome, Nish)
(G2/624 p 219)
Lichnowsky to Jagow. Grey has just seen text of S reply to ultimatum. His pleas to R for moderation seem to have borne fruit. So D must now influence AH to accept S reply. All here convinced key to situation lies in Berlin.
(TGM D. 1.31.pm, R.4.37 pm)
(G3/97, p.238)
Grey to Goschen. Lichnowsky says they now accept mediation AH-R. S reply went further than expected, probably because of R's influence.. Will continue to work with Berlin while they try to keep the peace. Moderation in Vienna now needed.
(TGM D. 3.00 pm)
(G3/109, p. 252)
Bertie to Grey. French government accepts your proposal and has instructed its ambassadors accordingly. Germans advise terms like "mediation", "intervention" and "conference" likely to upset the Austrians. Better to speak of conversations, moderating influences etc
(TGM D 2.45 pm, R 4.45 pm)
(BD/183)
Grey to Buchanan. Benckendorff here says D and AH think we will stand aside whatever happens. Reminded him that British fleet had not dispersed after manoeuvres but also that we do not promise anything more than diplomatic action. Also said that we keep hearing from D and AH that R will do nothing if no Serbian territory is taken and it would be absurd if we appeared at Berlin and Vienna to be more Serbian than the Russians.
(TGM D. 3.30pm)
(G2/550 p 150) (HA)
Tschirsky to Jagow. AH has decided to declare war tomorrow or latest day after mainly to cut the ground from any intervention attempts.
(TGM D 15.20, R. 16.37)
(G2/498, P.107)
- 8 -
Bethmann Hollweg to Wilhelm II. Report. Attached Lichnowsky's TGM (most likely No 97 above). As you wished, Grey's suggestion was passed on to Berchtold. AH must decide. If we refuse any role as intermediary, especially while GB and F influencing R, we would be seen by England and the whole world as responsible for the conflagration and as the real warmongers. That would make it impossible to maintain in D. the present public support and would deflect GB from its neutrality.
( R. Neues Palais 28.7, 5.00)
(G2/508, p. 113)
Buchanan to Grey. Sazonov had long talk yesterday with Szögyény. Concluded R so much suspected in Vienna that useless for R to offer its good offices in Belgrade but maybe GB and I could help in Vienna. No mobilization order issued yet.
(TGM D. 10.06 am, R 1.15 pm)
(G3/107, p.249)
Bienvenu-Martin to J.Cambon. D backed AH on Friday so on Saturday Powers advised S to yield. Then on Sunday, D says wants to cooperate to maintain peace. Grey trying to get conference going. R will stand aside and GB, F, D and I will meet in London while AH, R and S abstain from active military operations. D favorable. Please speak to and support British colleague however you can.
(TGM. D.12.45 pm)
(G3/104, p. 246)
J. Cambon to Bienvenu-Martin. Speak Jagow. He wants to join the mediation attempt but it could begin only if events not precipitated (by mobilizations etc)
(TGM D. 12.55, R. 3.45 pm)
(G3/103, p 245)
Bienvenu-Martin to Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires, London. We support Grey's proposals and you are authorized to take part. But all depends on D's influence with AH.
(TGM D. 1.30 pm)
(G3/105, p. 247)
Lichnowsky to Jagow. If Grey. now succeeds in his efforts, in which backed by entire nation, relations with GB will remain good. Otherwise not and we will have England against us
.(TGM D. 5.08 pm, R.8.40.pm)
(G3/99, p.240)
Goschen to Grey. Jagow had said mediation would amount to arbitration and so impossible unless both AH and R agreed. Thought direct contact Sazonov and Berchtold best. If R mobilized only in south, D would not but must be careful about surprise. Goschen added that no sign of Jagow having said anything at all to Vienna about restraint or moderation.
(TGM D.6.17 pm, R. 9.00 pm)
(G3/110.p.253)
Lichnowsky to Jagow. Localisation impossible unless AH and S settle. If not, English think mediation hopeless. Essential we ie D press AH to settle.
(TGM D. 6.17 pm, R.8.40 pm)
(G3/98, p.239)
Pourtalès to Jagow. Saw Sazonov. He wanted exchange of views amongst the Powers to "build a golden bridge". Sazonov much more conciliatory now. (Bethmann Hollweg added, not sure if should pass this to Lichmowsky. He tells Grey far too much and Grey might support R more if he sees that Berlin and St Petersburg are still speaking).
(TGM D. 8.40 pm, R 28.7 4.36 am)
Szögyény to Berchtold. Jagow said "in strictest secrecy" that very soon he would send on Grey's mediation proposals. He does not support them and advises AH to disregard them. Jagow had sent on Grey's note to Tschirsky but had not instructed Tschirsky to present it to Berchtold. Can therefore say to Grey that he had done as promised.
(TGM. D. 9.15 pm, R. 28.7, 9.00 am)
(G3/95, p. 236)
Bethmann Hollweg to Lichnowsky. We began immediately Grey's desired mediation operation in Vienna. We have also told Berchtold that Sazonov wants direct talks.
(TGM. R. 23.50)
(G2/504, p. 111)
Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirsky. Copy of Lichnowsky's TGM ( G3, No. 99 above). Having refused Grey's suggestion of a conference, we cannot refuse also this request. (very similar then to report to Kaiser ie seen by all world as warmongers etc) And in impossible position in D where we must present ourselves as being forced into war.( Wo wir als die zum Kriege Gezwungenen dastehen müssen). So get Berchtold's views on Grey's proposals and also Sazonov's wish for direct talks.
(TGM D. 23.50,R. 28.7, 5.30)
(G2/503, p. 111)
Tuesday, 28 July
AH declares war on S. at 11.00 am.
Bethmann Hollweg to Lichnowsky. Grey distinguished between AH-S and AH-R and said could mediate only for latter but now asks us to use influence on AH. (see No 97 above) We can't. AH has already rejected S reply to ultimatum. Tell Grey so.
(TGM D. 2.00 am)
(G3/101, p. 243)
Wilhelm II to Jagow (manuscript note). AH ought to be satisfied with S reaction provided real guarantees obtained eg partial occupation and payment of three sets of mobilisation costs. (AH had also mobilised partially against S in 1908-9 and 1912-13).
(Neues Palais D. 10.00 am)
(G3/112, p. 256)
Goschen to Grey. Jagow has now refused proposed conference to me and to F and I but still wants to work with us to maintain peace. If sincere, perhaps he is objecting only to "conference" and another word should be chosen. Could ask what he proposes. Note. Grey says he will suspend efforts if R and AH talk directly.
(TGM D 2.03 pm, R 2.45 pm)
(G3/119, p. 262)
The following item is the TGM 1521 which HA has already drawn to the attention of the list since it was not included in the original British "Blue Book" and in an apparently manipulated version in the original Russian "Orange Book". However, the later "British Documents" gives it in full and with some explanation. The British concluded that what had happened was that Benckendorff received a telegram from Sazonov the first three paragraphs referred to the proposals communicated to Sazonov by Buchanan in St Petersburg while the next two paragraphs were intended only for Benckendorff and his colleagues in Paris and Berlin. It seems that in error, the Russian Embassy clerk cut the document at the wrong point so that the British were given, besides the three paragraphs they were intended to receive, the fourth which they were not. The fifth, which completed the full text sent by Sazonov was not available until after the war.
Thus Grey saw paras 1, 2, 3 and 4 but not para. 5.
- 10 -
Communication Benckendorff to Grey. ( Paras. 1, 2 and 3)Sazonov and Buchanan have talked and former wants Grey to organize a four Power (GB, F, D and I) conference to find a way out. Sazonov has started to talk to AH and it looks hopeful. If we get no further, Sazonov accepts British proposal or any other which could resolve the conflict.
(Paras 4 ) I (Sazonov) wish to prevent a misunderstanding which (the French) reply to D about advice re moderation to be given to us. (Para. 5) We must refuse in advance such counsels since we have already gone as far as we can in accepting AH's demands.
(BD/206) HA
Schoen to Bethmann Hollweg. Talked to Bienvenu-Martin. He said best means of avoiding general war was to stop a local one. AH ought to be satisfied with S's reply. Schoen replied D had had no part in AH's actions, that R had done nothing to restrain S. Had said from start that it ought to be localized and AH not prevented from following up her just demands.
(TGM 113 "afternoon")
(G3/113, p. 257)
Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirsky. Do not know what AH is doing now. Delay is exposing us to mediation efforts and further delay will expose AH to war guilt even amongst German people. Essential blame for eventual extension falls on R.(NB eventuel in German means only possible). R seems to be understanding AH point of view. AH must repeat no territorial ambitions but needs guarantees eg partial occupation etc of S performance of undertakings. Talk suitably with Berchtold.
(TGM D. 10.15 pm, R 29.7 , 4.30 am)
(G3/115, p. 259)
Wednesday 29 July
R decided against partial mobilisation in four districts.
Poincaré and Viviani return Paris at 13.20.
Austrian bombardment of Belgrade began.
Bethmann Hollweg to Pourtalès. Tell Sazonov that if R goes further with mobilization we will be obliged to mobilize and then a European war can hardly be avoided.
(TGM D. 12.50, R 16.35)
(G2/662, p 265) (HA)
Lichnowsky to Jagow. Grey has heard that Berchtold refused to let Szápáry talk directly to Sazonov. What could we suggest if no conference? Grey pleased that Jagow trying "with some success" to mediate between AH and R and is willing to help. Lichnowsky urged Grey to warn R against mobilising on D's borders. Grey understands from I that S now disposed to further concessions to AH.
(TGM D 2.08 pm, R 5.07 pm)
(G3/128. P. 285)
Mensdorff to Berchtold. Grey thinks danger of general war increasing but is in constant touch with Bethmann Hollweg who is also seeking means to mediate between Vienna and St Petersburg.
(TGM D. 4.32 pm R 30.7 9.00 am)
(G3/122, p. 276)
Lichnowsky to Jagow. Spoke Grey. Sazonov wants Grey to take up mediation again but hostilities must cease. We have already accepted in principle. Grey thought suitable basis would be if Ah were to occupy Belgrade and announce her conditions. Grey thought S would then be punished etc.
(TGM D 6.39 pm, R 9.12 pm)
(G3/130, p. 288)
- 11 -
N2 to W2. Wants Austro-Serbian problem referred to the Hague.
(TGM D 8.20 pm, R 8.42 pm)
(G3/129,p, 287)
Thursday 30 July
Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirsky. We now face a war of us two against four. AH ought to be satisfied by occupying Belgrade and other places. Must urge AH to accept mediation on these "honourable conditions".
(TGM D. 2.25 am, R "midday".)
(G3/133, p 291)
Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirsky. Understand from Sazonov via Pourtalès that AH has refused direct dealings with R. Serious error. Would "be direct provocation of R's armed interference. Please speak to Berchtold seriously.
(TGM D. 3.00 am, R 7.10 am)
(G3/134, p 292)
Berchtold to Szápáry. Sazonov seems to have misunderstood. Suggest as if it came from you that we are willing to talk. What does he want to talk about? Act at once and report.
(TGM D. 1.20 pm)
(G3/140, p 301)
Bethmann Hollweg to Tschirsky. Sent on no. 130 above. AH must concede something. If not, if Grey's efforts in Paris and St Petersburg succeed, Vienna will bear full responsibility and make our position with our own people untenable. AH must accept Grey's proposals. Speak emphatically to Berchtold.
(TGM D 9.00 pm, R 31.7, 3.00 am)
(G3/143, p. 305)
R decides for full mobilization. Order sent out 6 pm and proclamation posters then appeared overnight in the streets of St Petersburg.
Friday 31 July
Tschirsky to Bethmann Hollweg. Acted on Bethmann Hollweg's instructions that AH should not refuse mediation but Austrians doubt if military operations could be interrupted.
(TGM dated 30.7 but D 31.7 1.35 am, R 4.35 am)
(G3/145, p 308)
Pourtalès to Jagow. Mobilization ordered. First day is today.
(TGM D 10.20 R 11.40)
(G2/875, p. 455)
13.00 D declares "Drohendes Kriegsgefahr" = Threatening Danger of War.
Goschen to Grey. Spoke Jagow. He asked AH if mediation acceptable given occupation of Belgrade but fears R's mobilisation will upset things. Could Grey get R to agree to such mediation and to refrain from mobilisation ?
(TGM D 1.45 pm, R 3.35 pm)
(G3/150, p 314)
Grey to Goschen. Suggest to Jagow that if D would speak AH and I should ditto R, AH might accept that the Four Powers would guarantee satisfaction to AH re S without impairing S's integrity and sovereignty. But military actions must be suspended. Told Lichnowsky this am that if D and AH made any reasonable proposals to preserve peace, then we would support them in St Petersburg and Paris. If F and R refused, GB would "have nothing more to do with the consequences". Otherwise, if F were involved, GB would be drawn in.
(TGM D. 2.45 pm)
(G3/163, p 329)
- 12 -
Berchtold to Szögyény. Tell Jagow we are willing to enter "more closely" with Grey's proposals. But present military action must take its course and Grey should get R to suspend mobilisation.
(TGM D 2.55 pm, R 2.52 pm - ??)
(G3/156, p. 323)
7 pm D's ultimatum delivered in Paris - 18 hours to reply.
Bunsen to Grey. R ambassador reported fairly friendly talks with Austrians. They do not object to Szápáry and Sazonov talking in St Petersburg.
(TGM R 9.00 pm)
(G3/153, p 318)
Midnight. D's ultimatum delivered in St Petersburg - 12 hours to reply.
Saturday, 1 August
Goschen to Grey. Jagow sympathetic but could do nothing until R replies to D demand to suspend mobilisation.
(TGM , D. 2.00 am, R 3.45 am)
(G3/165, p. 332)
Szápáry to Berchtold. Spoke Sazonov. Still seems to be some chance of diplomatic negotiations. Sazonov prefers neutral ground of London. Nothing I have said committed you.
(TGM D 10.45 am, R 1.00 pm)
(G3/168, p 340)
Note. Berchtold spoke Schebeko. Latter wanted direct negotiations in London. Berchtold "did not go any further but began friendly unofficial conversation". Dumaine then came and spoke in "just as peaceful a strain".
(Minute)
(G3/169, p 342)
No more documents relating to mediation attempts
Afternoon D declares mobilization.
4 pm Paris. F declares mobilization
7 pm St Petersburg. D's declaration of war delivered.
.Sunday 2 August
Jagow to Below. Open immediately the annex 88 (sent on 29.7). Make some changes. Most important was time limit reduced from 24 hours to 12. Hand over 8 pm tonight so expiry is 8 am tomorrow.
(TGM D 14.05)
(G2/1073, P. 628
Monday 3 August. D declared war on F.
Tuesday 4 August (early) D invades B.
(late) GB declares war on D.
Thursday 6 August AH declares war on R.