Chapter Two

1. For his letter to Pinckney, see Appendix, p. 318. back to text

2. American exporters have never been enthusiastic about this arrangement. In the fall of 1914 they protested against the Dutch Government assuming a monopoly of flour purchases for Holland. It was claimed that this monopoly, in supplanting the normal competition of Dutch dealers, prevented Americans from getting a competitive price for their flour. back to text


Chapter Three

3. The "necessity of protecting the belligerent's national safety" is the excuse offered for every wrong committed in this war. back to text


Chapter Five

4. Grain and flour were already so considered. On February 9 Ambassador Page cabled from London that the British navy had been instructed to treat these commodities as absolute contraband. back to text

5. However, neutral cargoes for Germany were to be confiscated if they consisted of anything on the swollen British contraband lists. That is, shipments to Germany were treated under the provisions of the October 29 Order in Council. back to text

6. In this July 23 note, England did not again (as in its February 10 note) cite the Matamoros cases, the real Civil War parallels to the British blockade situation. As we shall see, these cases are directly opposed to the British contention. back to text


Chapter Six

7. On May 3 the British Embassy at Washington issued a statement of instructions to American exporters as to how to ship to neutral Europe. It is printed in Appendix, p. 325. back to text

8. For the full text of Jefferson's letter, see Appendix, p. 318. back to text


Chapter Seven

9. However, the Declaration of London, under which England and France were both acting, recognized the validity of such a transfer as the Dacia. back to text

10. See Minority Report of the Merchant Marine Committee of the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, Appendix, p. 322. back to text


Chapter Eight

11. Amsterdam despatches reported that, up to March 10, floating contact mines had been taken up and rendered harmless along the Dutch coast to the number of 378. Of these, 214 were of British origin, 22 German, 33 French, and 109 unknown. back to text

12. Reprinted in Congressional Record, February 3, 1915, pp. 3232-3233. back to text

13. See table on p. 117. back to text

14. British scientists seem not to agree as to the importance of cotton in the making of explosives. On July 16 W. F. Reid, formerly president of the Society of Chemical Industry, addressed that society in London. Apparently referring to Ramsay, he said:

"There is practically no cotton used in the manufacture of high explosives. The whole thing is a great fraud. There may be some trace of cotton in the explosive but the bulk of it is coal products. Eminent scientists have made erroneous statements on this subject. If people associated with science would speak only on the branches with which they are connected, the advantages would be very great." back to text

15. The paragraph ends: "It is impossible for one belligerent to depart from the rules and precedents and for the other to be bound by them." back to text

16. The statement is abstracted in Chapter VI. back to text

17. For the text of the agreement, see Appendix, p. 322. back to text

18. In a letter written to the London Times in April, James G. Peel of Manchester, a large cotton dealer, shows that the exports of Egyptian cotton to Germany and Austria dropped from 99,000 bales in the months October-March of 1913-1914, to nothing in those months of 1914-1915. But the exports of Egyptian cotton to Italy and Switzerland, neighbors of Austria and Germany, increased exactly 99,000 bales to the period under question. back to text

19. This does not include exports to Bulgaria, Austro-Hungary and Denmark, for which figures were not available. back to text


Chapter Nine



'Sept. 1913

Sept. 1914

Increase, 1914









"Other Europe"








It is fair to assume that the increase of shipments to "Other Europe" was for the Scandinavian countries. "Other Europe" means Europe exclusive of England, France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Holland, Italy and Russia. back to text

21. Even today when a so-called "blockade" is maintained, the Bermuda cases are no justification for Britain's stoppage of our exports to Scandinavia, for forwarding to Germany by sea. These goods are to be forwarded to German ports which Britain admittedly does not blockade; namely, the German ports an the Baltic. British exports to Nassau were to be forwarded to Confederate ports which we were blockading. back to text

22. All but absolute contraband trade. back to text

23. For the vessels detained, dates, cargoes and destination see Appendix, p. 323. back to text

24. It is instructive to compare this statement of principle with the continued British action in this war of expanding the fixed contraband list of the Declaration of London. back to text


Chapter Ten

25. For text of Agreement, see Appendix, p. 324. back to text


Chapter Eleven

26. Exports of canned beef have increased from $350,000 to $9,900,000. back to text

27. On August 5 a New York importer of German goods said in the New York Times: "England says that the money that is being earned by manufacturers of arms and war supplies should be a compensation for the losses sustained by the importers. But let me say that if I were to go to any manufacturer who has earned money on war contracts and say to him, 'Brother, through obeying the British Order in Council I have lost my business, money, home and everything I possess in the world. Will you kindly let me have $100,000 of the fortune you have made on war supplies, to put me on my feet?'---you can pretty near guess his answer." back to text


Chapter Thirteen

28. The situation could have been paralleled with regard to our attitude towards Germany. We protested the sinking of passenger vessels with Americans aboard. After doing that, we might have appointed two Foreign Travel Advisers, attached to the State Department, whose function would have been to inform prospective travelers what ships the German Ambassador, on behalf of his government, would agree not to torpedo. back to text

29. For this circular. of the Foreign Trade Advisers, see Appendix, p. 327. back to text

30. Moreover, these goods have been sold to American retailers who may take measures against the importers for failure to deliver. back to text


Chapter Fourteen

31. The German potato crop averages 40,000,000 to 50,000,000 tons. back to text

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